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Value First: Comments on Mohan Matthen’s




While I welcome Mohan Matthen’s insistence that art is connected to aesthetic
pleasure, I worry about his commitment to viewing pleasure as prior to, and
constitutive of, the value of art. I raise my reservations by (i) dispelling his criticism of
the reversed explanatory direction, and (ii) showing problems for his commitment. As
an alternative, I offer an account of pleasure that explains it in terms of the
independent value of art—an account that is free of the problems Matthen raises
against this explanatory approach.
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1. A Welcome Link: Response to a Standard Objection
During the past century, the idea that art is necessarily connected to pleasure has faced
great opposition. I welcome Mohan Matthen’s insistence on the link, and in this ﬁrst
section augment his defence of the idea by sketching a response to a standard objection.
In the remaining sections I raise concerns about the speciﬁc way Matthen articulates
the connection between art and pleasure.
The most common objection to the link between art and pleasure is based on a
narrow conception of pleasure. On this conception, all pleasure, including aes-
thetic pleasure, is passive and merely sensory like a feeling of elation or a thrill.
But, it is argued, the experience of art is active, complex, and not merely sensory.
Hence, the objector concludes, there is no reason to think that art is connected to
pleasure. But Matthen—like Aristotle, Kant, and others before him—gives us good
reasons to reject that conception of aesthetic pleasure, and accordingly to resist
that conclusion. His challenge is grounded in a distinction between ‘r-pleasures’,
which are largely passive, and ‘f-pleasures’, which are complex and often ‘cogni-
tively demanding’ [8]. For Matthen, aesthetic pleasure is an instance of the latter.
As he emphasizes, aesthetic pleasure involves understanding, and has an active,
‘intellectual’ [13], and not merely sensory nature. This way of thinking about the
pleasure in art is supported by its phenomenology. For example, taking aesthetic
pleasure in Henry James’s The Ambassadors requires that we attend to the struc-
ture of its sentences, appreciate how loaded they are, unpack their meaning, and
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recognize the complexity of the characters and the plot line through the charac-
ters’ choice of words and tone of voice. To enjoy the novel fully, one might need
to be familiar with some of James’s other writings, appreciate their similarities
and differences, and consider The Ambassadors’ relation to comparable novels in
the relevant canon. Aesthetic pleasure is not a passive sensation, but either itself a
form of appreciation and recognition of aspects of the work, or closely related to
appreciation and recognition through a certain nexus. And so, the active and com-
plex nature of the experience of art provides no reason to deny the link between
art and pleasure.
Those who oppose the necessary association between art and pleasure may per-
sist by arguing that, rather than pleasure, engagement with some great artworks
involves much pain. But this too is based on a narrow conception of pleasure.
Matthen’s account of the ‘f-nexus’ connected to aesthetic pleasure helps to explain
how the experience of certain artworks in which we take aesthetic pleasure can
involve pain. For him, aesthetic pleasure facilitates and reinforces costly, difﬁcult,
and even painful engagement with works because it is both rewarding and cogni-
tive. Additionally, because it is highly plausible that some artworks, predominantly
tragedies, are great partly because they are painful, it is also plausible that the
same works can and should be found aesthetically pleasing partly because they are
so painful. For example, Michael Haneke’s Amour is worthy of aesthetic pleasure
in part because it is disturbing to watch. Painful art, then, is no reason to deny
either the connection between pleasure and art that Matthen elaborates on or the
view that the evaluation of a work is constituted by aesthetic pleasure.
2. A Caveat: Pleasure and Value
While I welcome the link between art and pleasure, I have reservations about the direc-
tion of Matthen’s explanation of aesthetic pleasure and the value of art. My worries
concern Matthen’s suggestion that pleasure is prior to, and in some sense constitutive
of, the value of art: that art is valuable because it is pleasurable.
Before I expand on these reservations, let me dispel a possible objection against
my wish to examine his take on the link between pleasure and value. One may
worry that introducing value is unfair to Matthen since he professes ‘not to pro-
pound any aesthetic norms … nor even try to show why we should value art’
[26]. But the paper does commit him to the view that the value of art is explained
by, and is grounded in, the experience of aesthetic pleasure that it gives rise to.
Matthen warns against trying ‘to explain pleasure in terms of the independently
existing aesthetic merit of its object… . It runs in the wrong direction’ [14]. He
also claims that ‘we judge objects to have aesthetic merit when they are a good ﬁt
for our psychological attitudes’ [15; cf. 20]. On his view then, the judgment of aes-
thetic value is based on the ﬁtness of objects to arouse aesthetic pleasure. Works
have aesthetic value in virtue of the aesthetic pleasure that engagement with them
arouses.
Like Cynthia Freeland [2.3: 32–33], I wonder if Matthen can consistently hold
on to this view, which appears to contradict some of his other contentions. For
example, how can Matthen avoid reducing ‘aesthetic norms to psychological atti-
tudes’ [fn. 5] as he wishes, if he is committed to the view that aesthetic merit is
explained by a work’s ﬁttingness to arouse these attitudes [15]? He also claims
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that ‘perception of value may increase my pleasure’ [10]. This seems to suggest
that the ‘degree’ of pleasure can depend on value, rather than the other way
around. But this is incompatible with Matthen’s view that ‘correct’ engagement
with a work is the one that produces a maximal degree of aesthetic pleasure [20].
3. Dispelling the Criticism of the Reversed Explanatory Direction: ‘Value-
First’
3.1 Informative About Pleasure
My main reservations about Matthen’s view that art is valuable because it is pleasurable
are more systematic than those just mentioned. I raise them by focusing on his criticism
of the reversed explanatory direction—the explanation of aesthetic pleasure by the
independent features that make a work aesthetically valuable. I will argue that such a
reversed explanatory strategy is free of the ﬂaws that Matthen attributes to it, and that
it is to be preferred to his own explanation.
Matthen describes this strategy as follows:
This ultra-Platonic stance subordinates subjective evaluation to objective value;… it runs in the
wrong direction. Saying that you like something because it is good rationalizes your mental atti-
tude. But it offers nothing informative about the mental process by which you came to your
evaluation. [14]
By way of a counter-example, consider the following ‘value-ﬁrst’ but ‘informa-
tive’ proposal: On a certain value-ﬁrst view, when one feels aesthetic pleasure it is
through this pleasure that one perceives the work and approves of it as valuable—
one enjoys the work as valuable. On this account, the value of a work does not lie
in the pleasure it gives, but in the aspects that make it worthy of pleasure—for
example in its ﬁne acting, powerful plot, and beautiful compositions. Properly
evaluating a work requires that one be responsive to what the work merits. But
this means, on the proposed view, that properly engaging with and evaluating a
work requires among other things that one feel pleasure in it, since, as Kant put
it, the value of art ‘has a claim to everyone’s satisfaction’ [1790, 5:282]. This is
neither motivational hedonism (the view that we are interested in art because it
gives us pleasure) nor value-hedonism, also known as value empiricism (the view
that art is valuable because experiencing it is pleasurable [cf. Shelley 2010]). If it
were any kind of hedonism, this would be a constitutive or formal hedonism—the
view that the evaluative experience of art, indeed its evaluation, necessarily
involves pleasure. I take it that this accords with Kant’s claim: ‘Taste is the faculty
for judging an object or a kind of representation through a satisfaction or dissatis-
faction’ [1790, 5:211]. Call this a hedonic view of valuing or evaluation, but not of
value.
Such an account implies a good deal about aesthetic pleasure: proper aesthetic plea-
sure is a feeling that reveals the work to be valuable in the way it actually is. This plea-
sure is not only object-directed— that is, not merely revelatory of the value of the
work—but also self-directed. It includes an awareness of itself as responsive to its
object’s value. Accordingly, as Matthen also maintains, aesthetic pleasure involves a
cognitive dimension and intentionality. Such an account can without contradiction add
that aesthetic pleasure involves attention, both to features of content and to features of
form—or, using Matthen’s helpful terminology, that it is connected to a nexus of
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learning and reﬁnement. For example, since reading The Ambassadors is demanding or
even difﬁcult, to properly enjoy it is very likely to enjoy what makes it a great novel: its
style, the composition of its sentences, its complexity, and its beauty, to name just some
of its valuable features. In and through its enjoyment, we become more attentive to
these aspects. And the more attentive we are, the better we understand its beauty and
power; and it is through this understanding that we come to enjoy it better. Aesthetic
pleasure is thus an attentive and intelligent appreciation of value. Accordingly, an
account of aesthetic pleasure can explain both its nature and its rational responsiveness
to the (independent) value of art.
3.2 Not Beset by Idealism
While Matthen explicitly charges the strategy underlying the value-ﬁrst account only
with an inability to be informative about pleasure, his description of it as an ‘ultra-
Platonic stance’ evinces metaphysical worries.
But holding that the value of art is independent of pleasure means only that whether
a work is valuable does not depend on whether it, or the activity of engaging with it,
gives (or is capable of giving) pleasure. It does not entail that the value of art resides in
any idealistic realm, or in any kind of absolute reality. In fact, this account is compatible
not only with the view that art, to paraphrase Susan Wolf, is a human activity that does
not exist in the absence of human life, but also with the view that the products of this
activity would have nothing recognizable as value if there were no human subjects
capable of appreciating them [cf. Wolf 2015: 77]. A view about the independence of
art’s value from pleasure need not entail any metaphysical commitments, let alone Pla-
tonic commitments. An advantage of this account is that it ﬁts the phenomenology of
our experience of art: it ﬁts the ordinary belief that value resides in the artworks one
encounters and is available to be experienced [cf. McDowell, 1998: 112]. No Platonic
ideas lurk in the vicinity.
4. Problems for Matthen’s Account
Matthen criticizes the view that aesthetic pleasure is a response to an independent value
as merely ‘rationalizing’ our mental processes [14]. By that he means to say that this
strategy offers a merely retrospective rationalization of aesthetic pleasure. But there is a
different sense of ‘rationalization’ that distinguishes the value-ﬁrst view from his. On
Matthen’s account, aesthetic pleasure is ‘rational’ in so far as it is ‘cognitively demand-
ing’ and linked to a nexus of learning. But the reversed explanatory strategy, which
takes pleasure to be a response to an independent value, regards it as rational also in so
far as it both reveals the work to be valuable and is responsive to the work as that which
merits pleasure. Aesthetic pleasure is a response to value, and therefore to reasons for a
pleasing evaluation.
An account that endorses this other kind of ‘rationalizing’ is preferable to Matthen’s
grounding of the value of art in aesthetic pleasure for the following reasons.
First, if we account for value in terms of its being a ‘good ﬁt for our aesthetic
psychology’, it would be very hard to explain why, say, The Ambassadors is more valu-
able than The Da Vinci Code, assuming that Matthen would accept this explanandum.
After all, pleasure in Dan Brown’s best-seller is more pervasive, as it is shared by more
people, and arguably more intense. If value is a matter of the pleasure generated by
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engaging with a work, how can we assign greater value to The Ambassadors? Matthen
probably thinks that contemplating it is more valuable than contemplating The Da
Vinci Code. But given that the pleasure in the latter is—in the straightforward way just
explained—‘greater’ than the pleasure in The Ambassadors, he cannot account for such
a difference between the two contemplative experiences.
Second, Kant convincingly argues that aesthetic pleasure is not private but universal:
normatively universal. For example, while I lack legitimate grounds to settle our dis-
agreement about whether eating oatmeal for breakfast is pleasurable, I can and should
seek agreement about the pleasure to be had from beholding Gustave
Caillebotte’s The Floor Scrapers. As many today accept, one can legitimately pursue
agreement in this case because aesthetic disagreement entails that one of us is at fault:
one of us is wrong. Aesthetic agreement and aesthetic universality are a matter of cor-
rectness. The best and simplest explanation of this correctness appeals to whether or
not each of us is properly responsive to the value of the work.
Now, I do not mean to suggest that Matthen is unable in principle to explain aes-
thetic correctness. He claims that ‘the “correct” way of engaging with art is the way that
is maximally productive of pleasure provided that this does not contradict fact’ [20;
emphasis in original]. But I worry that the notion of ‘fact’ at stake here is insufﬁcient
for the kind of correctness ordinarily required for resolving evaluative disagreements
(cf. Freeland [36]).
The facts Matthen seems to have in mind are ‘plain facts’—facts about whether or not
Pride and Prejudice is about zombies, to use his example. But most familiar disagree-
ments, even those that seem most straightforward, cannot be resolved by an appeal to
facts of this kind. Say we disagree about Pride and Prejudice. We both enjoy it, but I
enjoy its perceptiveness, wit, complex characters, and beautiful sentences. You, by con-
trast, enjoy how it calls to mind your daughter’s good qualities. In this case, one of us is
wrong even if neither evaluation contradicts the ‘plain facts’; even if Elizabeth Bennett
does resemble your daughter in the relevant respects. Matthen’s explanation falls short
here. Appeals to experiences that maximize pleasure, and to plain rather than value-laden
facts about the work, explain such normative failures inelegantly at best. At worst, Matth-
en’s strategy cannot account for correctness at all. Valuable features of a work—those
that constitute its value independently of whether they yield pleasure—provide simpler
and more successful explanations. On this ‘value-ﬁrst’ view, one of us readers is wrong
because one of us fails to track and to be responsive to features that in fact make Pride
and Prejudice valuable, full stop. Aesthetic pleasure, on my view, neither explains nor
grounds aesthetic value even though it does constitute aesthetic evaluation.
Finally, note that the alternative proposal outlined here neither denies that pleasure
is an affective state nor asserts that it is produced ‘at will’. Like other affective attitudes
such as care and love, and not unlike belief, aesthetic pleasure is not produced at will.
Nonetheless, like these other attitudes, it does involve a crucial dimension of activity,
normativity, responsiveness to reasons, and therefore some form of rational agency
[Gorodeisky forthcoming]. Regarding aesthetic pleasure as explained by value, rather
than as explaining value, is just what we need.
My disagreement with Matthen about the direction of explanation notwithstanding,
I thank him for a rich and thought-provoking paper, and for unﬂinchingly drawing the
connection that many like to oppose: the link between art and pleasure.
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